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AMERICA GIVES: A SURVEY OF 
AMERICANS’ GENEROSITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper describes a telephone survey (called America Gives) which asked 1,304 
randomly-selected adults about their philanthropic behavior (giving of time and treasure) 
after the events of September 11, 2001.  The questions were part of a larger national 
study (n = 4,200) on giving and volunteering that was being conducted at the time of the 
September 11 attacks.  This paper provides a brief description of the study that was being 
conducted at the time of the terrorist attacks, the methodological considerations resulting 
from the immediate philanthropic response to the September 11 events, and steps that 
were taken to adapt the study to the changing national conditions.  Next we provide 
descriptive results from the survey, along with multivariate analyses of the determinants 
of giving and volunteering in this unique situation.  Finally, we provide some caveats for 
researchers who may want to assess household giving and volunteering, and discuss 
implications for nonprofit managers and policy makers. 
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AMERICA GIVES: A SURVEY OF  
AMERICANS’ GENEROSITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 
Introduction  
The events of September 11, 2001 were indelibly etched into the minds of all 
Americans. The economic costs of the terrorist attacks were enormous—the attacks on 
the World Trade Center alone totaled an estimated $33 to $36 billion through June 2002 
(Bran, Orr, & Rapaport, 2002).  The emotional impact may have been even larger. 
Among the common emotional responses of many Americans were grief, fear, anger, 
sorrow, sympathy, pride in the country, and a desire to “do something positive.”  To try 
to ameliorate these financial and emotional costs, American families, corporations, and 
foundations responded to the crisis by donating money, volunteer time, blood, clothing, 
expertise, and in-kind contributions to assist the victims and the rescue efforts.   
These behaviors are not unexpected in times of disaster, according to the 
sociological literature.  In fact, while the general public and officials may expect negative 
behaviors such as looting during disasters, research demonstrates that altruism and 
prosocial behavior is much more common and normal at such times (Fischer, 1994; 
Tierney, 2001).  Raphael (1986) suggests that such impulses may be genetic, in that 
altruism is a drive that may be brought to the surface during an emergency to assist in the 
survival of the group or species.  These impulses promote the growth and convergence of 
formal and informal infrastructures, such as emergency funds, to assist in the recovery 
efforts.  In the case of the September 11 terrorist attacks, some of these funds (e.g., 
American Red Cross) already existed, and others, such as the September 11 Fund, were 
rapidly developed. The feelings of altruism were so strong in the immediate post-impact 
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period that individuals, businesses, and foundations contributed funds at a level 
unprecedented in previous disasters (Rooney, 2002).  By December 31, 2001 (3 ½ 
months after the attacks), an estimated $1.9 billion had been received for the relief and 
recovery efforts (AAFRC Trust, 2002). 
As the dust began to settle six months after the attacks, the philanthropic 
community began to take stock of the donations made in the relief efforts.  Both the New 
York and the Washington, DC Regional Associations of Grantmakers published reports 
of the philanthropic efforts in their communities to that point (Cox, 2002; Washington 
Regional Association of Grantmakers, 2002).  Organizations in other major cities also 
released reports on the impact of the September 11 events on nonprofits in their 
communities (e.g., Donors Forum of Chicago, 2002).   
At the national level, the Foundation Center kept a continuous record, posted on 
its website, of corporate and foundation contributions to tragedy-related causes.  They 
also produced a number of reports providing analysis and commentary on the impact of 
the September 11 events (Foundation Center, 2002; Renz, 2002a, b).  In addition, the 
Association of Fundraising Professionals published a report (2002) on a survey of 
nonprofit development officers regarding the impact of the 9/11 events on fundraising in 
charities across the country.   The Ford Foundation also commissioned a study involving 
interviews with officials from foundations and corporations that made large donations to 
the relief efforts (Seessel, 2002). 
The contributions of individual households are less well-documented in general, 
both in relation to the September 11 attacks and to other disasters.  In fact, whereas 
emergency volunteer behavior relating to other disasters has received some previous 
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attention in the academic literature (e.g., Britton, 1991; Wolensky, 1979), very little 
attention has been paid in the past to the financial contributions of individuals in response 
to disasters.  However, a few studies were conducted shortly after the September 11 
events to document the philanthropic behavior of individual households in response to 
this particular tragedy.   
One national survey (Schuster, et al, 2001) conducted September 14 to 19, 2001, 
reported that 36 percent of the adults surveyed responded to the attack on America by 
making donations.  Another survey by the National Opinion Research Center (Smith, et 
al., 2001) fielded in the immediate post-impact period (September 13 to 27), found that at 
that time “almost half (49%) contributed to charities, 24 percent donated or tried to 
donate blood, and 8 percent did extra volunteer work for an organization.  A full 59 
percent did at least one of these actions.” These studies were conducted very soon after 
the tragedy, so that the percentages are smaller than those seen in later studies. 
In a separate poll conducted October 5 to 8, 2001, INDEPENDENT SECTOR (2001) 
found that “more than half (58%) gave money to charities in response to the terrorist 
attacks in the four weeks just after September 11. Also, 13 percent gave blood and 11 
percent gave time. Overall, 70 percent of Americans reported charitable involvement in 
some way.”    In addition, a poll conducted by USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup on December 
14-16, 2001 (Nasser, 2001) found that 64 percent of respondents reported making 
contributions to funds for the victims.  
None of these studies attempted to measure the amounts of giving and 
volunteering Americans contributed after the events of September 11.  However, the 
percentages reported in these studies generally are consistent with and help to verify the 
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results in our study.  Taken together, these results lead us toward the emerging picture of 
the philanthropic behavior of Americans in the first few weeks and months following the 
tragedy.    
Methodology 
At the time of the September 11 attacks, the Center on Philanthropy was 
conducting a multi-pronged, national research study on individual and household 
philanthropy of Americans.  We refer to this study as “America Gives.”  This project was 
an extension of an earlier, smaller study done in Indiana (Rooney, Steinberg & Schervish, 
2001; Steinberg, Rooney & Chin, 2002).  In the America Gives study we compared and 
contrasted the findings from different survey techniques related to giving and 
volunteering behaviors.  The main purpose of that study was to explore whether the 
length and variety of prompts made a difference in reported giving and volunteering.   
The America Gives study involved five different survey “modules”, which are 
summarized in Table 1. Among these we replicated central design elements of surveys 
done in the US by Independent Sector (1999) (the Area module), and in Canada (Hall, et 
al., 2001) (Method module). Another module (Method-Area) utilized an enhancement of 
the methodology used in a survey in California, described by O’Neill & Roberts (2000). 
Another module replicated a survey module designed by the University of Michigan and 
the Center on Philanthropy for a longitudinal study, the philanthropy supplement to the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID module). Finally, we asked a Very Short module 
(“Did you give to charity last year? If so, how much? Did you volunteer last year? If so, 
how much?”).  Table 1 summarizes the modules by the types of prompts, the number of 
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questions, and use of inducements.  Note that all modules included the exact same set of 
16 demographic questions. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
To collect our data, Walker Information, an Indianapolis-based research firm, 
used random digit dialing of households to obtain samples of at least 800 respondents per 
module, using the five surveys to measure personal philanthropy throughout the United 
States.  Each respondent participated in only one of the modules. Table 2 shows the 
demographic characteristics of each module sub-sample and the total sample. We discuss 
briefly only those sample characteristics that are statistically significantly different from 
the combined or total sample.  Compared to the total sample means and proportions, the 
Very Short Module contained significantly more Blacks (10.4% vs. 8.1% overall).  The 
PSID had more couples (64.3% vs. 61.5% overall).  The Area module had slightly fewer 
households with incomes in excess of $120,000 (5.2% vs. 5.8%).  The Method Module 
had fewer couples (58.5% vs. 61.5%), a larger percentage with incomes of $40,000 or 
less (47.9% vs. 42.4% overall), a smaller percentage of high-incomes (5.1% vs. 5.8%), 
and a concomitant smaller percentage who itemized their deductions (45.9% vs. 49.8%).  
The Method-Area module did not differ from the overall sample in any significant 
manner.   
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 We used $5 pre-paid phone cards as inducements to increase response rates.  
Previous research (Rooney, Steinberg & Schervish, 2001) indicated that inducements 
were particularly effective in increasing response rates in the longest (Method-Area) 
module, so we gave phone cards to 75% of the respondents in that module.  We also gave 
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phone cards to at least 10% of participants in the other modules.  The number of 
inducements for each module is shown in Table 1. 
Survey and Methodological Modifications to Accommodate the September 11 
Attacks 
Calling for America Gives began August 1, 2001 and thus the project was “in the 
field” when the terrorist attacks occurred on September 11.  Due to the unusual and 
emotional nature of this event, we immediately suspended calling for four weeks. 
Because our study was partially completed, we were faced with a choice: stop the project 
and only use the data collected at that point, or attempt to continue the study. We quickly 
realized that the terrorist attacks provided a natural, though unfortunate, experiment in 
philanthropic behavior on a national scale.  Further, we felt that the Center on 
Philanthropy was in a unique position to study this philanthropic behavior because we 
already had collected data on giving and volunteering immediately prior to the attacks. 
The opportunity to study personal philanthropy both before and after a significant 
national event was too important to forsake, despite the tragic circumstances. 
Within two days of the attacks support in the form of donations from the public 
began pouring in. We realized that our major dependent variables (charitable giving and 
volunteering in the past year) would be confounded with tragedy-related giving.  That is, 
respondents’ total reported donations and volunteer hours might be increased because of 
the tragedy.  To accommodate this situation, we added a new variable in our dataset to 
indicate whether subjects were contacted before or after September 11.  In addition, we 
added six extra questions to all modules to query philanthropic behavior specifically 
related to the tragedy.  We were aware that by changing the nature of the surveys mid-
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stream we might contaminate the results of our original study, particularly if the tragedy-
related questions were added to the beginning of each module.  On the other hand, we 
reasoned that because of the differences in length and detail and the modules, responses 
to the tragedy-related questions might not be complete, reliable, or have the same 
meaning across modules if they were appended to the end of each module.   We decided 
to add the tragedy-related questions to the beginning of all modules.  Respondents then 
were instructed not to include those donations and volunteer hours in the rest of their 
responses.  We hoped this strategy would minimize the differences in reported giving 
after September 11 to non-September 11 causes.  
We also were confronted with another possible confound to the study, because the 
calling for two of the modules (Very Short and Area) had already been completed prior to 
September 11.  Calling for the other three modules had been started but was in various 
stages of completion. The events of September 11 were of such impact that we felt our 
modules might not be directly comparable.  To deal with this problem we had two 
options: 1) contact some of the subjects again from the already-completed Very Short and 
Area modules, and ask about their tragedy donations separately; or 2) add more subjects 
to the already-completed sub-samples. Due to the difficulties involved in interviewing 
exactly the same people twice, we chose the second option.  These extra subjects received 
the extra tragedy-related questions, along with the regular module questions.   Table 1 
indicates the number of subjects interviewed pre- and post-September 11 for each 
module. 
A third potential confounding factor related to the new dependent variables 
coming from the tragedy questions (tragedy-related giving and volunteering) and the 
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original design of the study.  We reasoned that the amount of household donations and 
personal volunteering related to the tragedy could increase over time.  That is, the longer 
the time lapse between September 11 and the date on which a respondent was called, the 
higher his or her tragedy-related donations might be.   Thus, one module sample might 
report significantly higher giving and volunteering than another sample, simply because 
they were completed at different times. Therefore it was important to begin and end the 
post-tragedy calling for all modules at approximately the same time.   Specifically, we 
ended all calling before the end of November, to avoid the typical seasonal increase in 
giving in December. 
Hypotheses and Analyses 
Our first level of data analysis was descriptive.  We looked at percentages of 
survey participants who responded to the tragedy with charitable behavior, the types of 
donative activity, and the amounts contributed.   
Due to the nature of this study we needed to test some hypotheses about our 
sample before we could draw any conclusions about giving and volunteering behavior in 
the wake of this national tragedy.  These hypotheses were as follows: 
H1:  There were no significant differences between pre- and post-September 11 
samples in terms of demographics.   
If supported, this hypothesis would allow us to conclude that the events of September 11 
did not play a significant role in determining who would be willing to respond to a 
telephone survey on household philanthropy.  Thus, any reported differences in giving 
and volunteering would be attributable to other factors than differences in the pre/post 
subsamples.  We used t-tests to analyze this hypothesis. 
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 In addition to H1, we developed three hypotheses to test whether we would be able 
to aggregate our data across modules for purposes of analysis of the tragedy-related 
questions.  If supported, H2 would allow us to conclude that the demographics of our 
module sub-samples were similar enough that we could combine them for the rest of the 
analyses.  H3 and H4, if supported, would indicate that the module used along with the 
tragedy questions had no effect on reports of tragedy-related giving or volunteering.  
These hypotheses are not the main focus of this paper and therefore we present them in 
more detail in the Appendix. 
 In addition to these four hypotheses related to the design of our study, we 
developed several hypotheses regarding giving and volunteering behavior in the wake of 
the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
H5:  There were significant differences in tragedy-related giving, based on 
demographic factors such as income, education, etc. 
H6:  There were significant differences in tragedy-related volunteering, based on 
demographic factors. 
H7:  There were significant differences in other types of charitable support (e.g., 
blood, food, clothing) related to the tragedy, based on demographic factors. 
In particular, based on previous research in the field of philanthropy (e.g., Bennett and 
Kotasz, 2000; Rooney, et.al., 2001), we expected that income, education and religiosity 
might be significant determinants of charitable giving related to the tragedy.  We 
expected that gender and religiosity might be significant determinants of tragedy-related 
volunteering (Independent Sector, 2001a; Mesch, Rooney, Chin & Steinberg, 2002) and 
that other types of charitable donations (food, blood, etc.) might also be determined by 
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demographic variables. We used multivariate (regression) methods for analyzing these 
three hypotheses. 
 The next two hypotheses relate to non-tragedy (general) giving and volunteering 
before and after the September 11 attacks.  We were interested in investigating whether 
different groups changed their giving and volunteering behavior in response to the 
terrorist attacks. 
H8:  Some groups of people changed their overall giving in response to the events 
of September 11.   
H9:  Some groups of people changed their volunteering in response to the events 
of September 11.   
Note that the dependent variables for these two hypotheses are different from those of the 
previous hypotheses (i.e., general rather than tragedy-related giving and volunteering.)  
We used t-tests, regressions, and Chow tests to test these hypotheses. 
Results 
 Descriptive analysis 
Our first level of analysis was descriptive in nature.  Our survey demonstrated that 
Americans were very generous in their response to the September 11 events.  Of the 
people surveyed, 74.4 percent responded to the tragedy with some form of charitable 
behavior—giving money; giving food, clothing, blood; and/or giving volunteer hours to 
help the victims.  Among those who responded to the tragedy by giving or volunteering, 
participation rates were as follows: 51.6 percent responded with only one of these types 
of charitable activity, 19.8 percent participated in two of them, and 3.0 percent 
participated in all three forms of philanthropy, as shown in Figure 1.   
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INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Financial Donations to the Relief Efforts 
Of the adults surveyed, 65.6 percent said they or their household made financial 
contributions to charities for the victims of the tragedy.   There was a wide outpouring of 
support—mostly in small donations.  Among contributing households, the average 
donation was $133.72.  The median was $50 and 74 percent gave $100 or less.  Looking 
at all households in the survey (including those that did not make donations), the average 
contribution was $85.41 and the median was $25. 
Other Charitable Donations 
In addition to monetary support to aid the victims, Americans were generous in 
other types of giving.  Of the adults surveyed, 27.2 percent indicated they made other 
donations to the relief effort, such as clothing, food and water, or blood.   As shown in 
Table 3, people who made this type of donation were significantly more likely (χ² = 
5.451, p = .021) to donate money than people who did not donate items such as food, 
clothing or blood. 
 [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Volunteering to help the victims 
Of those surveyed 8.4 percent indicated they performed voluntary service to help 
the victims of the tragedy.  The average volunteer donated nearly 17 hours of time.  The 
median level was 8 hours.  Volunteers were significantly more likely than non-volunteers 
to make donations of money (χ² = 8.251, p = .004), or other types of donations such as 
food, clothing or blood (χ² = 15.523, p = .000) (see Table 3).  This is consistent with 
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previous research (Hall, et. al, 2001; Independent Sector, 1999; Jalandoni & Hume, 2001; 
Steinberg, et. al., 2002), which has shown that volunteers are more likely to donate than 
non-volunteers.  A number of economic researchers (e.g., Andreoni, Gale & Scholz, 
1996; Brown & Lankford, 1992; Duncan, 1999) have studied the question of the 
interdependence between charitable donations of money and time, but this research 
focuses on annual contributions as affected by tax treatments.  We are not aware of any 
previous studies that look at joint response of donations of time and money to some 
specific external event.   
Analysis of Hypotheses 
H1:  There were no significant differences between pre- and post-September 11 
samples in terms of demographics.   
Demographics of the pre- and post-Sept. 11 samples are shown in Table 4.   
Comparing the two samples, the percentage of black respondents was significantly lower 
(t = 2.889, p = .004) and the percentage of respondents with a bachelor’s degree was 
significantly higher (t = -3.937, p = .000) in the post-tragedy sample.  Although minority 
households have sometimes been under-represented in surveys of household giving (e.g., 
Rooney, et al, 2000) we knew of no reason why the events of September 11 would have 
negatively affected the willingness of blacks, and positively affected the willingness of 
college graduates to respond to the survey.  In the absence of any other explanation we 
concluded that these differences were an artifact of the random sample and that the two 
samples were similar enough in other ways to draw conclusions based on pooled data.   
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
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 H2, H3 and H4 were designed to test whether we would be able to aggregate our 
data across modules for purposes of analysis of the tragedy-related questions.  All three 
hypotheses were supported.  Since these hypotheses are not the main focus of this paper 
we present these results in the Appendix.  Our next three hypotheses concerned the 
determinants of giving and volunteering in response to the events of September 11.   
H5:  There were significant differences in tragedy-related giving, based on 
demographic factors such as income, education, etc. 
H6:  There were significant differences in tragedy-related volunteering, based on 
demographic factors. 
H7:  There were significant differences in other types of charitable support (e.g., 
blood, food, clothing) related to the tragedy, based on demographic factors. 
 We tested hypotheses 5, 6, and 7 in a multivariate framework applying our 
traditional tools (OLS, Probit, and Tobit) to the amount of giving and volunteering 
that was related specifically to 9-11 causes.  We explain donations of time and money 
in regression frameworks by including a set of dummy variables for the five modules, 
along with the demographic variables.  If there are pure module (survey or 
prompting) effects, they will show up as significant coefficients for the module 
dummy variables. 
Unfortunately, the error terms in these regressions do not obey the classical 
assumptions that justify the exclusive use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions.  Donations cannot be negative, so the error term has a truncated 
distribution.  In addition, giving and volunteering data appears to have a non-normal 
(heteroskedastic) error structure (e.g., Bradley, Holden and McClelland, 1999; 
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Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish, 2001; Steinberg, Rooney, and Chin, 2002).  Under 
these circumstances OLS is biased and inconsistent.  Tobit regression models, on the 
other hand, do not generate negative predicted donations.  Unfortunately Tobits are 
not robust to non-normal (heteroskedastic) errors.  An additional problem with Tobit 
models is that they enforce a proportionality between a variable’s effect on the 
probability of giving and the size of the donation for those who give.  Another 
approach, a two-stage Heckman model, solves this latter problem, but is not robust to 
non-normality.  Because there is no commonly-accepted ideal remedy for all of these 
problems, we conducted four different approaches (Tobit, Heckman two-stage, OLS 
on the full sample, and OLS on positive donors only), in the hope that a consistent 
picture would emerge. We also ran Probits to assess the effects of the various survey 
modules on the probability of donating or volunteering at all.  In order to simplify the 
presentation here, we focus our discussion on the Tobits and Probits. A complete set 
of results, including the OLS and Heckman two-stage models, is available from the 
authors upon request. 1 
Our regression models use levels rather than logarithms for the continuous 
variables, for several reasons.  First, it significantly simplifies the interpretation of the 
results, which is helpful for a broad inter-disciplinary readership.  Second, given the 
nature of the analyses, the large number of zeros (i.e., non-donors and/or non-volunteers) 
lends itself to using level data with Tobit analyses. Finally, many of our main variables of 
interest are dichotomous or multichotomous in nature, so we chose linear forms for 
simplicity. 
                                                 
1 Univariate (ANOVA) results are also available from the authors upon request. 
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 As shown in Table 5, we found that the only significant variable in explaining 
differences in dollars donated was earnings:  middle income earners ($40,000-$80,000) 
gave $29 (OLS and $28 in Tobit) more than low-income earners, and high-income 
earners ($80,000+) gave almost $75 (OLS and $55 more in Tobit) more to 9-11 causes 
than did low-income earners.  These results are consistent with much previous research in 
the field of philanthropy (e.g., Bennett and Kotasz, 2000; Rooney, et.al., 2001), which 
shows that income is a significant determinant of charitable giving. As we might expect, 
given that we asked the tragedy-related giving questions at the beginning of the interview 
and all interviewees were given the same questions, none of the module variables were 
significant at traditional levels.  The results for dollars given were similar when we used 
Tobits.   
 [INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Our Probit results found that middle income and high-income households were 
respectively 26 percent and 25 percent more likely than low-income households to report 
making any gifts to 9-11 causes.  The only other variables that attained significant levels 
in the Probit analysis were the age variables (age and its squared term).  These suggest 
that the probability of making any 9-11 gifts increased slightly with each year of age but 
at a decreasing rate. 
Turning to volunteering for 9-11-related activities, we found that respondents who 
had volunteered in the previous year donated significantly more hours, on average, than 
those who had not (F (1,1286) =10.377, p = .001).   Using regression analysis (see Table 
6), we found that religiosity was a strong predictor of 9-11 volunteering.  Those who 
attended religious service at least once a week were 42 percent more likely to have 
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volunteered for 9-11 activities than those who attended less often or did not attend 
religious services at all. This is consistent with previous research, which shows that 
religious attendance is a significant determinant of volunteering (e.g., Brown, 1999; 
Independent Sector, 2001a).  A somewhat surprising result was that those with children 
in college were 19 percent more likely to volunteer than those without, but this was only 
weakly significant (p = 0.099).  Another anomalous result was that the PSID module was 
61 percent less likely to elicit such volunteer activities when compared to the very short 
module.  This result seems to be driven by the relatively few who volunteered at all, so 
the actual distribution of volunteers across modules would matter more than in a larger 
sample. 
 [INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
When we looked at the number of hours volunteered for 9-11-related causes, we 
found there were few variables that attained significance and those that did had very 
small coefficients, suggesting that there were few if any consistent patterns of behavior 
that we could capture with traditional demographic data.  Those with at least some 
college education volunteered almost an hour more than those with a high school degree 
(or less), but this was only weakly significant (p =0.061).  Those with children in college 
volunteered almost an hour more than those without, and those who attended religious 
services more frequently volunteered just over an hour more than those who did not.  We 
got similar results in the Tobit, so do not explore this further. 
When examining other types of giving to the tragedies (blood, food, clothing), we 
only asked whether or not a household had done so, which constrained our analysis to 
Probit regressions.  As shown in Table 7, males were 6.6% less likely to donate blood, 
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food or clothing.  Those with some college were 5.6% more likely to donate blood, food 
or clothing, but this was only weakly significant.  Finally, those with middle incomes 
($40,000 to $80,000) were 7.2% more likely to make this type of donation than lower 
income households 
 [INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 The next two hypotheses relate to non-tragedy (general) giving and volunteering 
before and after the September 11 attacks.   
H8:  Some groups of people changed their overall giving in response to the events 
of September 11.   
H9:  Some groups of people changed their volunteering in response to the events 
of September 11.   
We were interested in investigating different groups changed their giving and 
volunteering behavior in response to the terrorist attacks.  It is important to note that the 
dependent variables for these two hypotheses were different from those of the previous 
hypotheses (i.e., general rather than tragedy-related giving and volunteering.) 
 Knowing that the philanthropic reactions to the attack on America may vary by 
some of the demographic groups, we disaggregated our pre and post samples by some of 
the key demographic factors and tested these differences a couple of ways.  First, we 
conducted t-tests for pre and post differences in unconditional means.  Then we ran 
regressions that included a dichotomous variable for the respondents surveyed after 9-11, 
to see whether sampling before or after 9-11 affected the coefficient of mean giving 
(controlling for income, education, race, etc.).  Finally, we compared the log-likelihood 
values and conducted Chow tests to see whether inclusion of the pre/post dummy 
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sufficed, or whether 9-11 affected all the other coefficients as well. While it would have 
been preferred to survey the exact same households pre and post 9-11, these regressions 
provide critical insights into whether or not 9-11 is associated with changes in 
philanthropic behaviors.   
 We first examined whether there were differences in the unconditional means for 
pre- and post-9-11 samples (see Table 8).  We found that all demographic groups 
reported more donations after 9-11, although not all of the differences were statistically 
significant.  Respondents who were whites, low-income (less than $40,000 per year), 
high income ($80,000 or more per year), tax itemizers, or who attended religious services 
at least once a week, reported significantly higher levels of donations after 9-11 than 
before the tragedy.  Respondents with some college education (but no degree) 
volunteered significantly more following 9-11.  There were no other statistically 
significant differences in the mean levels of volunteering by any of the various 
demographic groups. 
 Table 9 shows the results of the Tobit and Probit regressions, in which we 
examined the effect on the conditional means of being sampled before or after 9-11, for 
each demographic group.  In this table, the Tobit estimates indicate the amount (in dollars 
or hours) that post-9-11 giving/volunteering by each group differed from pre-event 
giving/volunteering.  The Probit estimates measure the increase in the probability that 
members of each group became donors as a result of 9-11. 
 Using these regression methods, we found no statistically significant differences 
(at p < .05) in reported amounts donated pre- versus post-9-11 (see Table 9).  However, 
the events of 9-11 did increase the probability of reporting donations for several groups.  
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Subjects who were white or other races (but not black), low-income, itemizers, had some 
college experience, or attended church services at least once a week were more likely to 
report making a donation (at least $1) following the events of September 11. 
 We also found several significant effects in estimating pre- and post-9-11 
volunteering in our Probit and Tobit frameworks (Table 9).  A larger number of volunteer 
hours were reported after 9-11 by respondents who were white, low-income, married, 
itemizers, had some college education, or attended religious services at least once a week.  
These same groups were also more likely to report volunteering at all post-9-11, along 
with medium income households ($40,000-$80,000 per year) and subjects with a college 
degree. 
 Finally, we conducted Chow tests to test whether or not the inclusion of the 
dichotomous variable for post-9-11 respondents improved the overall estimation of the 
models.  For example, among low income households, we found very strong evidence for 
both the Tobit (chow test = 2097.8; critical value .005 = 32.8) and the Probit (chow test = 
539.0; critical value .005 = 32.8) that there were differences in the pre and post giving 
patterns.  Although the chow test scores are smaller for our volunteering analyses, we still 
find relatively large improvements in both the Tobit (chow = 42.3; critical value .05 = 
26.29) and the Probit (chow = 37.9; critical value .05 = 26.29).  These results lend 
additional credence to the use of pre-post subsamples among different demographic 
groups, thus supporting our conclusion that the pattern of giving for some groups of 
people was different after the events of September 11, 2001. 
Summary and Conclusions 
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 Our results show that most households (74.4 percent) responded to the September 
11 attacks on America with some form of charitable behavior—giving money; giving 
food, clothing, blood; and/or giving volunteer hours to help the victims.  Of the adults 
surveyed, 65.6 percent said they or their household made financial contributions to the 
relief efforts.  Most of these donations were made fairly quickly, within the first few 
months following the tragedy, and most of the contributions were relatively small, 
particularly in comparison to foundation and corporate donations.  For example, among 
contributing households the average gift was $133.72 and the median was $50.  Looking 
at all households in the survey (including those that did not make a contribution), the 
mean was $85.40 and the median was $25. 
The $133.72 average gift found by the survey was higher than might be expected.  
The median gift of $50 may be more representative of giving by most Americans in 
response to September 11.  We hypothesize that several factors may have played a role in 
raising the amount of the average gift.  For example, the simple random sample that was 
used (originally designed for the different purposes of the larger survey) over-represented 
certain groups of donors who tend to report higher-than-average donations on other 
surveys of giving.  Also, respondents reported several large gifts, ranging from $800 to 
$5,000, which raised the average. 
In addition, some respondents may have “over-reported” the amounts that they 
gave (reporting amounts higher than they actually gave), perhaps because they wanted to 
feel more a part of the intense emotional and patriotic outpouring of support in response 
to the horrific events of September 11.  Some of the gifts reported may be donations 
respondents intended to make, but for which they had not yet actually sent a contribution 
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at the time of the survey.  Finally, although the survey specifically asked about giving to 
the victims of September 11, some of the gifts reported may have been given to local 
organizations for other relief or non-relief causes in the spirit of responding to the 
tragedy.  The outpouring of giving and media coverage also may have raised awareness 
of the need for philanthropic giving more generally. 
The most important variable in determining the amount of cash donations was 
household income.  The probability of making any 9-11 gifts increased slightly with each 
year of age, but at a decreasing rate.  These results are consistent with the previous 
research on the determinants of giving in general, which shows that household income is 
the most important factor in decisions about charitable giving. 
Turning to voluntary service, 8.4 percent of those surveyed reported volunteering 
to help the victims of the tragedy. The average volunteer donated nearly 17 hours of time, 
and the median level was 8 hours.  It is not surprising that few people reported 
volunteering, given the difficulty of volunteering in this particular tragedy.  For example, 
travel was restricted, volunteering on-site was discouraged early on, and the primary need 
was for people with very specialized skills.   
A significant factor in determining volunteer service to help the tragedy victims 
was whether or not a person had done any volunteer work in the previous year.   We also 
found that religiosity (that is, religious attendance at least once a week) was a strong 
predictor of 9-11 volunteering.  This is consistent with previous literature on volunteering 
in general.  A somewhat surprising result was that those with children in college were 
more likely to volunteer than those without.  Few variables predicted the number of 
volunteer hours, suggesting that there were few if any consistent patterns of behavior that 
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we could capture with traditional demographic data.  The particular circumstances related 
to the September 11 tragedy were probably so unusual that the typical patterns of 
volunteering behavior did not apply. 
Of the adults surveyed, 27.2 percent reported making other types of donations 
after the tragedy, such as blood, food or water, and clothing.  We found similar effects for 
giving blood etc. to the tragedy in the multivariate framework as we did for other types of 
giving: gender, income and education made small but significant differences in the 
probability of making such donations. Donations of this type have not received much 
emphasis in the research literature, so this represents a special contribution of this study. 
When we examined general (non-tragedy) giving, we found that several 
demographic groups (subjects who were white or other races (but not black), low-income, 
itemizers, had some college experience, or attended church services at least once a week) 
were more likely to have donated at all following the attack on America.  However, after 
controlling for income, education, etc., there was no strong evidence that any of the 
demographic groups studied gave significantly more money following 9-11.  On the other 
hand, a larger number of volunteer hours were reported after 9-11 by respondents who 
were white, low-income, married, itemizers, had some college education, or attended 
religious services at least once a week.  These same groups were also more likely to 
report volunteering at all post-9-11, along with medium income households ($40,000-
$80,000 per year) and subjects with a college degree. 
One possible shortcoming of this study is that respondents may have overstated 
their philanthropy after the events of September 11, in an effort to portray themselves in a 
more favorable, “patriotic” light.  However, all Americans were affected by the terrorist 
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attacks and any inflation in reporting would most likely affect all groups equally.  For this 
reason we believe that the differences that we found between groups are real ones. 
Overall, our results were consistent with previous findings on the determinants of 
philanthropic behavior (giving and volunteering) in general. However, there were a 
number of variables that we were unable to measure that may have played an important 
role in determining individual and household action in response to this particular tragedy.  
For example, we did not gather any information on personal feelings of empathy, anger, 
security, or patriotism, or whether or not respondents had immediate family members or 
close friends directly affected by the attacks. 
The America Gives study was unique because the Center on Philanthropy was “in 
the field” gathering data on individual and household philanthropy of Americans at the 
time of the September 11 attacks.  This gave us an opportunity to study personal 
philanthropy both before and after a significant national event.  After the September 11 
attacks, many people worried that individual donations to nonprofit organizations would 
be negatively affected—that is, that people would donate less money to nonprofits 
because they had made donations related to the tragedy.  Future work with this data set 
will focus on the question of whether 9-11 giving and volunteering crowded out non-9-11 
giving and volunteering.   
 We have some suggestions for researchers who may want to study donative 
behavior in relation to this crisis or others.  First, we would recommend obtaining as 
much information about demographics of the sample as possible, in order to further the 
knowledge of determinants of individual philanthropy in response to crisis.  Second, we 
would recommend that anyone querying household giving or individual volunteering for 
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the month of September 2001 (and the months immediately following) specifically 
include questions to assess charitable behavior related to this tragedy.  This would help to 
stimulate recall of tragedy-related donations, and provide a more accurate assessment of 
other types of donations without confounding the two.  In addition, including this type of 
question will enable future researchers to obtain a longer-term picture of the potential 
“crowding out” effect of personal philanthropy in response to a national crisis. 
 Hopefully, nonprofit managers will never again face the question of how to 
manage during such a terrible crisis, but our results do suggest a few things for 
practitioners to consider in the future.  First, the nature of the crisis may lead to different 
opportunities to fundraise and to recruit volunteers.  Nonprofits must strategize as to how 
the crisis is affecting the national psyche and what impact it is likely to have on their 
subsector.  Our results found different reactions to 9-11 by income, educational, and 
racial groups, which might inform how nonprofits proceed in the future.  Second, the 
effects were different for giving and volunteering.  Nonprofits need to have volunteer 
coordinators (whether paid or themselves volunteers) to take full advantage of increased 
interest in volunteering.   
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APPENDIX 
H2:  There were no significant differences between module subsamples after 
September 11, with respect to demographics. 
H3:  There were no significant differences between post-September 11 sub-
samples in terms of tragedy-related giving. 
H4:  There were no significant differences between post-September 11 sub-
samples in terms of tragedy-related volunteering. 
H2, H3 and H4 were designed to test whether we would be able to aggregate our data 
across modules for purposes of analysis of the tragedy-related questions.  If supported, H2 
would allow us to conclude that the demographics of our module sub-samples were 
similar enough that we could combine them for further analysis.  H3 and H4, if supported, 
would indicate that the module used along with the tragedy questions had no effect on 
reports of tragedy-related giving or volunteering.  This makes sense because with all 
modules we asked about charitable activity related to the tragedy before asking about 
other types of giving and volunteering, and all modules used the same set of tragedy-
related questions. H2, H3 and H4  were analyzed using one-way ANOVAs (t-tests). 
H2 was supported for all demographic variables (see Table 8).  We concluded that 
the demographics of our module sub-samples were similar enough that we could combine 
them for purposes of analysis of the tragedy-related questions. 
 [INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
In order to test H3 and H4 we decided to exclude from our analyses two outliers 
who otherwise would have skewed the analysis. One of these was a woman who reported 
a donation of $65,000 toward tragedy relief—she happened to complete the Method-Area 
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module.  (The next-highest response was $5,000).   The other outlier was a female who 
volunteered 840 hours to help the victims of the tragedy (equivalent to 10 weeks of 12-
hour days, 7 days a week).  She completed the PSID module.  (The second-highest 
response was 200 hours).  Whether the reported values are true or not, they were so 
different from other responses that they would distort the results, regardless of which 
module was used. 
 As shown in Table 11, both of these hypotheses were supported.  There were no 
significant differences between the sub-samples in terms of charitable donations of time 
or treasure in response to the September 11 tragedy.  This held true whether we included 
all subjects or looked at donors only or volunteers only.  
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
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TABLE 1:  AMERICA GIVES MODULES      
  
Demographic 
Questions 
Tragedy 
Questions 
Very 
Short  PSID Area Method 
Method-
Area 
Sample Size: Total 4,200 1,304 900 800 900 800 800 
     Pre-Sept. 11 2,896 --- 800 512 800 576 208 
     Post-Sept. 11 1,304 1,304 100 288 100 224 592 
                
# Questions: Total 16 6 6 46 121 170 458 
     Giving --- --- 4 38 42 47 454 
     Volunteering --- --- 2 4 79 123 4 
                
Types of Prompts:               
     Giving --- yes/no, 
amt 
yes/no, 
amt 
(formal 
only) 
Prompt 
by 
subsector 
of contri-
bution 
(formal 
only) 
Prompt by 
subsector 
of contri-
bution; 3 
prompts 
for 
informal 
giving, 1 
for 
political 
donations 
Prompt 
by 
method 
of 
contact; 
6 
prompts 
for 
informal 
giving 
Prompt by 
method of 
contact, 
then by 
subsector; 
7 prompts 
for 
informal 
giving 
     Volunteering --- yes/no, 
amt 
yes/no, 
amt 
(formal 
only) 
yes/no, 
then by 1 
subsector 
(formal 
Prompt 
formal 
vol'g by 
subsector,  
Prompt 
formal 
& 
informal 
yes/no, 
then by 1 
subsector 
(formal 
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only) 1 general 
prompt for 
informal 
vol'g 
vol'g by 
method 
of 
contact 
only) 
Inducements: totals             
     None 3,202 --- 805 698 805 694 200 
     Calling card--Total 998 --- 95 102 95 106 600 
         Pre-Sept. 11 501 --- 95 56 95 47 208 
         Post-Sept. 11 497 --- 0 46 0 59 392 
 
 

TABLE 2: -DEMOGRAPHICS OF TOTAL SAMPLE BY MODULE    
 Total Very    Method- 
 Sample Short PSID Area Method Area 
Sample size 4,200 900 800 900 800 800 
Female (%) 59.3 57.6 60 61 58.8 59.3 
Couples (%) 61.5 60.9 64.3 * 61.4 58.5 * 62.3 
White (%)  81.1 79.4 82.3 81 81.4 81.4 
Black (%) 8.1 10.4 * 7.1 7.6 7.5 7.5 
Hispanic (%) 4.7 4.3 4.4 5.3 5.2 4.1 
Asian (%) 2.1 2 2 2.4 1.8 2 
Other Minority (%) 4.1 3.8 4.1 3.7 4.2 5 
Age:         
Mean 45.3 45.23 45.34 45.43 45.47 44.78 
Median 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Min  18 18 18 18 18 18 
Max  93 91 87 92 90 93 
Education (%):        
≤ High school diploma 30.6 32.1 31.7 29 31.2 28.9 
Some college 36.8 34.9 37 38.5 36.9 36.8 
Bachelor’s degree 18.2 18.7 17.4 16.4 18 20.4 
Grad/prof school 14.4 14.3 13.8 16.1 13.9 13.9 
Joint tests       
Income (%):       
 $0 - 40,000 42.4 39.6 39.2 42.6 47.9 ** 42.9 
$40,000 to $80,000 37.3 40.7 40.1 35.3 34.1 36.2 
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$80,000 + 20.3 19.7 20.7 22.1 18 20.9 
Total reporting income 81.2 ** 82.4 80.4 78.4 81.1 83.9 
Joint tests     **  
% with income > $120,000 5.8 6.1 6.3 5.2 ** 5.1 ** 6.5 
% who itemized deductions 49.8 52.3 50.1 52.5 45.9 ** 47.4 
% of itemizers with donations 78.7 78.3 79.8 77.5 80.7 77.7 
% of sample with itemized gifts 34.3 36.1 35.1 35.7 31.9 32.3 
* = p < .10       
** = p < .05       
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TABLE 3:  RELATIONSHIPS AMONG RESPONSES TO THE 9-11 TRAGEDY 
   
 Total  
 Sample  
Post-9-11 N 1,304  
   
Donated $ 65.6%  
Donated Other Items 27.2%  
Volunteered 8.4%  
Total Participating in Some Way 74.4%  
   
Relationship Between Volunteering & Giving Money 
Percentage of Volunteers Who:   
   Made no donations of $ 21.7%  
   Made donations of $ 78.3%  
Percentage of Nonvolunteers Who:  
   Made no donations of $ 35.5%  
   Made donations of $ 64.5%  
Chi-Square 8.251***  
Correlation betw. $ & hours given 0.04  
   
Relationship Between Volunteering & Giving Items 
Percentage of Volunteers Who:   
   Made no donations of items 56.9%  
   Made donations of items 43.1%  
Percentage of Nonvolunteers Who:  
 44
   Made no donations of items 74.4%  
   Made donations of items 25.6%  
Chi-Square 15.523***  
   
Relationship Between Giving Money & Giving Items 
Percentage of Item Donors Who:   
   Made no donations of $ 29.4%  
   Made donations of $ 70.6%  
Percentage of Item Nondonors Who:  
   Made no donations of $ 36.4%  
   Made donations of $ 63.6%  
Chi-Square 5.451**  
   
* = p < .10   
** = p < .05   
*** = p < .001   
 
 45
 
TABLE 4: DEMOGRAPHICS OF PRE- AND POST- 9-11 SAMPLES 
     
 Total Pre- Post-  
 Sample
Sept. 
11 
Sept. 
11 t 
Sample size 4,200 2,896 1,304 --  
Female (%) 59.3 59.7 58.4 0.841 
Couples (%) 61.5 61.2 62 -0.661 
     
Race:     
White (%)  81.1 80.3 82.8 -1.727* 
Black (%) 8.1 8.9 6.2 2.889*** 
Hispanic (%) 4.7 4.7 4.6 0.147 
Asian (%) 2.1 2 2.1 -0.144 
Other Minority (%) 4.1 4.1 4.2 -0.822 
     
Age (Mean) 45.3 45.49 44.73 1.445 
    
Education (%):      
≤ High school diploma 30.6 31.2 29.3 1.144 
Some college 36.8 37.5 35.3 1.303 
Bachelor’s degree 18.2 16.6 21.6 
-
3.937*** 
Grad/prof school 14.4 14.7 13.8 0.781 
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Income (%):     
 $0 - 40,000 42.4 42.4 42.3 -0.004 
$40,000 to $80,000 37.3 37.6 36.8 0.38 
$80,000 + 20.3 20 20.9 -0.553 
     
% with income > $120,000 5.8 5.5 8 -1.271 
% who itemized deductions 49.8 50.7 47.8 -1.6 
% of itemizers with donations 78.7 78.1 80.2 0.978 
     
# of kids at home (mean) 0.85 0.86 0.81 1.322 
# of kids in college (mean) 0.12 0.11 0.13 -9.62 
     
Note:  * = p < .10     
         ** = p < .05     
        *** = p < .01     
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TABLE 5: REGRESSIONS ON TRAGEDY GIVING   
      
Variables TOBIT  PROBIT   
 Marginal Impact a,c,d,e,f,g Marginal Impact a,b,d,e,f 
      
CONSTANT -42.5744583  -0.558309   
PSID -0.443457  -0.217939   
AREA -2.62946757  -0.311153  
METHOD 19.0017063  -0.011653  
METHOD-AREA 5.30541  -0.089534  
AGE 0.51845137  0.034230 ** 
AGE**2 -0.006480  .333114E-03 ** 
MALE 2.97119  -.418499E-02  
WHITE 10.4263374  0.161609  
SOME COLLEGE 7.63094354  .696397E-02  
INCOME (40-80K) 27.5966599 *** 0.264858 *** 
INCOME(80+) 55.0012228 *** 0.252251 ** 
# of KIDS 1.81572  0.061575  
# of KIDS IN COLLEGE 8.19201436  0.047829  
SIGMA 78.9141872 ***   
     
N 899  1043  
Adjusted R squared     
     
LOG LIKELIHOOD -3794.67  -643.254   
      
 48
Notes:     
a Asterisks indicate the level of statistical significance for any particular independent variable. 
     (*p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01)     
b Probit marginal impacts estimate the marginal probability of donating due to changes in each variable. 
c Tobit marginal impacts estimate the change in donation amount due to changes   
     in each variable.      
d All coefficients for categorical variables are relative to the values of the excluded category for that  
     variable (females, minority, single, high school or less, income $0-40K, religious attendance < once  
     A week, Area-Method module).     
e Statistical significance is determined for the coefficients on the latent index for donations,   
     with respect to the latent indicator variable.    
f Table with standard errors or t-scores is available on request from the authors.   
g Tobit marginal impacts are calculated at the mean of the data.    
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TABLE 6: REGRESSIONS ON TRAGEDY VOLUNTEERING    
       
Variables TOBIT  PROBIT    
 Marginal Impact a,c,d,e,f,g Marginal Impact a,b,d,e,f  
       
CONSTANT -4.0043 *** -1.96866 ***   
PSID -0.8154 * -0.613666 **   
AREA -0.29777  -0.091477    
METHOD -0.45091  -0.364874    
METHOD-AREA 0.19587  -0.043714    
AGE 0.07565  0.037005    
AGE**2 -0.001080  -.519308E-03 *   
MALE -0.24701  -0.105876    
MARRIED -0.13195  -0.170154    
WHITE -0.09939  .388883E-02    
EDUCATION 0.50536 * 0.180967    
INCOME (40-80K) -0.06584  -0.032399    
INCOME(80+) 0.22973  0.120311    
# of KIDS -0.12795  -0.041444    
# of KIDS IN COLLEGE 0.33817 * 0.185641 *   
RELIGIOUS 0.7592 *** 0.420241 ***   
SIGMA 1.7762 ***     
       
N 1038  1044    
Adjusted R squared       
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LOG LIKELIHOOD -535.386  -269.41    
       
Notes:       
a Asterisks indicate the level of statistical significance for any particular independent 
variable.     
     (*p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01)      
b Probit marginal impacts estimate the marginal probability of donating due to changes in each 
variable.  
c  Tobit marginal impacts estimate the change in donation amount due to changes in each 
variable.    
d All coefficients for categorical variables are relative to the values of the excluded category for   
     that variable (females, minority, single, high school or less, income $0-40K, religious  
     attendance < once a week, Area-Method module).      
e Statistical significance is determined for the coefficients on the latent index for donations, with    
     respect to the latent indicator variable.      
f Table with standard errors or t-scores is available on request from the authors.    
g Tobit marginal impacts are calculated at the mean of the data.     
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TABLE 7: PROBITS ON OTHER TYPES OF TRAGEDY GIVING (BLOOD, FOOD, CLOTHING) 
       
Variables PROBIT      
 Marginal Impact     
       
CONSTANT -0.21031      
PSID module 0.098762      
Area Module 0.086285      
Method Module 0.071452      
Method-Area Module 0.072301      
Age 0.000057019      
Age**2 -0.000041676      
Male -0.065626 **     
Married -0.032652      
White -0.029542      
Some college 0.056196 *     
Income $40-80K 0.07193 **     
Income $80K+ 0.027433      
# of  Kids 0.01221      
# of Kids in College 0.021581      
Religious 0.018107      
       
N 1,037      
       
LOG LIKELIHOOD -590.013      
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Asterisks indicate the level of statistical significance for any particular independent variable.  
     (*p<0.10   **p<0.05   ***p<0.01)      
Probit marginal impacts estimate the marginal probability of donating due to changes in each 
 variable. 
All coefficients for categorical variables are relative to the values of the excluded category for   
    that variable (females, minority, single, high school or less, income $0-40K, religious  
    attendance < once a week, Area-Method module).      
Statistical significance is determined for the coefficients on the latent index for donations,  
     with respect to the latent indicator variable.      
Table with standard errors or t-scores is available on request from the authors. 
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TABLE 8: PRE-POST EVENT COMPARISONS OF NON-TRAGEDY GIVING 
AND VOLUNTEERING 
      
Formal Giving      
 N Pre-event mean  Post-event mean t  
White 862 1442.35 1851.53 -2.65 ** 
Other race 114 987.09 1240.46 -0.69  
Income < $40K 448 530.53 801.11 -2.35 * 
Income $40-80K 389 1433.74 1571.14 -0.71  
Income > $80K 220 2985.35 3982.68 -2.15 * 
< High school 300 679.51 755.85 -0.56  
Some college 373 1154.62 1515.56 -1.85  
College degree 383 2213.53 2751.96 -1.80  
Itemizer 469 2089.60 2716.73 -2.59 ** 
Religious 433 2144.19 2884.58 -2.87 ** 
      
Volunteering      
 N Pre-event mean  Post-event mean t  
White 857 88.61 101.08 -1.35  
Other race 113 82.42 79.01 0.12  
Married 619 88.77 103.47 -1.37  
Income < $40K 445 76.49 92.35 -1.22  
Income $40-80K 386 86.14 87.43 -0.12  
Income > $80K 220 112.24 122.24 -0.49  
< High school 298 59.66 72.16 -0.88  
Some college 371 68.89 102.03 -1.96 * 
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College degree 381 133.68 111.12 0.09  
Itemizer 466 97.65 114.09 -1.30  
Religious 430 118.43 142.19 -1.57  
      
Note:  * = p < .05      
         ** = p < .01      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 9: PROBITS AND TOBITS ON NON-TRAGEDY GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING a, b, c, d, e, f 
        
Formal Giving        
Variables  Tobit Marginal  Probit Marginal  
 N Coefficient Impact Coefficient Impact 
White 2692 80.1066    0.032191 * 
Black 271 128.635   -0.104768   
Other race 367 355.535    0.13264 * 
Single never married 677 -18.2459   0.07255   
Single living with partner 119 36.0489      
Married 1946 154.468   0.164407   
Divorced 425 -203.169   0.265595   
Widowed 182 891.538      
Income < $40K 1420 261.996    0.073331 **
Income $40-80K 1256 -29.9429   0.019174   
Income > $80K 679 -86.1469   0.286158   
< High school 978 -190.961   0.055715   
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Some college 1235 199.761    0.056393 * 
College degree 1142 273.776   0.262472   
Itemizer 1571 220.667   0.215078   
Religious 1452 333.825    0.047628 * 
Less religious 1890 37.8771   0.164549   
        
Volunteering        
Variables  Tobit Marginal  Probit Marginal  
 N Coefficient Impact Coefficient Impact 
White 2674  27.441915 **  0.069727 **
Black 266 43.9306   0.297614   
Other race 368 86.9276   0.286261   
Single never married 675 28.9482   0.089572   
Single living with partner 119 64.3254      
Married 1935  31.274089 **  0.092857 **
Divorced 421 39.1358   0.087764   
Widowed 183 132.068   0.32312   
Income < $40K 1411  34.847454 **  0.0754 * 
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Income $40-80K 1241 46.0768    0.085562 * 
Income > $80K 681 54.9842   0.14579   
< High school 971 62.1296   0.125299   
Some college 1228  32.546541 ** 0.171898   
College degree 1134 51.5718    0.1004 **
Itemizer 1556  30.921094 **  0.10732 **
Religious 1441  48.235458 **  0.12038 **
Less religious 1879 40.5832   0.117745   
        
        
a Asterisks indicate the level of statistical significance for any particular independent variable.     
     (*p<0.05   **p<0.01)        
b This table summarizes results from many regression analyses, in which we examined, for each demographic   
    group, the effects of the following independent variables: PSID module, Area module, Method module,   
   Method-Area module, Age, Age squared, Male, White, Some college, Medium income, High income,   
   number of kids, number of kids in college, and 911 dummy.  (Excluded: Area-Method module, Female,  
  Minority, High school or less, Low income.) Coefficients and marginal impacts are shown for the 911 dummy 
   variable only, for each demographic group. Tobit and Probit coefficients are shown for nonsignificant results,  
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  and marginal impacts are shown for significant results.     
c Probit estimates measure the increase in the probability that members of each group became donors as    
    A result of 9-11.        
d Tobit estimates indicate the amount (in dollars or hours) that post-9-11 giving/volunteering by each group   
     differed from pre-event giving/volunteering.      
e Table with OLS results, standard errors, and t-scores is available on request from the 
authors.    
f Tobit marginal impacts are calculated at the mean of the data.      
 
 TABLE 10: POST 9-11 SUB-SAMPLES: DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
MODULES  
        
 Total Very  (IS) (Hall) Method-  
 Sample Short PSID Area Method Area F 
Sample size 1,304 100 288 100 224 592 -- 
Female (%) 58.4 61 57.3 52 60.3 58.8 0.615 
Couples (%) 62 70 60.6 64 59 62.1 0.989 
        
Race:        
White (%)  82.8 78.6 86.2 81 83.9 81.7 1.033 
Black (%) 6.2 4.1 4.9 7 6.4 7.1 0.594 
Hispanic (%) 4.6 9.2 2.8 4 5 4.7 1.706 
Asian (%) 2.1 3.1 1.8 4 1.8 1.9 0.659 
Other Minority (%) 4.2 5.1 4.2 4 3.2 4.7 0.67 
        
Age (Mean) 44.73 44.77 44.75 44.32 44.66 44.81 0.022 
        
Education (%):         
≤ High school 
diploma 29.3 33.7 33.1 23 29.1 27.9 1.265 
Some college 35.3 26.5 32.8 39 37.7 36.5 1.532 
Bachelor’s degree 21.6 23.5 21.6 22 20.2 21.8 0.109 
Grad/prof school 13.8 16.3 12.5 16 13 13.9 0.339 
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Income (%):        
 $0 - 40,000 42.3 37.2 40.2 37.7 49.7 42.2 1.719 
$40,000 to $80,000 36.8 42.3 39.3 39 30.6 36.7 0.907 
$80,000 + 20.9 20.5 20.5 23.4 19.7 21.1 0.091 
        
% with income > 
$120,000 8 8 6.9 5 7.1 6.1 0.288 
% who itemized 
deductions 47.8 44.2 48.9 50 50.5 46.6 0.401 
% of itemizers with 
donations 80.2 86.5 75.4 86.4 82.6 79.6 1.03 
        
# of kids at home 
(mean) 0.81 0.85 0.71 0.79 0.75 0.88 1.216 
# of kids in college 
(mean) 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.977 
        
Note:  * = p < .10        
         ** = p < .05        
        *** = p < .01        
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TABLE 11: MODULE EFFECTS ON TRAGEDY 
RESPONSE   
      
$ Amount Donated for Victims of 9-11   
 Total Sample 
 N Mean Median SD F 
Total 1,229 85.41 25.00 254.67 0.300 
Very Short 93 67.49 25.00 132.30  
PSID 267 76.44 25.00 172.31  
Area 94 86.55 22.50 198.38  
Method 211 85.82 50.00 167.76  
Method-Area 564 92.27 25.00 327.78  
      
      
 Donors only 
 N Mean Median SD F 
Total 785 133.72 50.00 308.41 0.288 
Very Short 61 102.90 50.00 152.10  
PSID 160 127.56 90.00 207.63  
Area 53 153.51 100.00 244.77  
Method 142 127.52 50.00 191.21  
Method-Area 369 141.03 50.00 396.83  
      
      
Hours Volunteered After 9-11 Attacks   
 Total Sample 
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 N Mean Median SD F 
Total 1,290 1.28 0.00 8.57 1.87 
Very Short 98 0.52 0.00 2.20  
PSID 286 0.93 0.00 7.30  
Area 97 0.43 0.00 2.13  
Method 222 0.60 0.00 3.24  
Method-Area 587 1.97 0.00 11.37  
      
      
 Volunteers only 
 N Mean Median SD F 
Total 98 16.84 8.00 26.67 1.06 
Very Short 8 6.38 4.00 4.93  
PSID 10 26.50 16.00 30.54  
Area 6 7.00 7.50 5.62  
Method 12 11.08 5.00 9.17  
Method-Area 62 18.69 8.00 30.39  
      
      
Note:  * = p < .10     
         ** = p < .05     
        *** = p < .01     
 
 63
 
 
Figure 1: Individuals' Responses to the Tragedy
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